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Festering Questions After Festo 
Harold C. Wegner* 
OVERVIEW 
Festo!  The more than ten year old patent law nightmare 
continued on February 6, 2003, where a thirteen member en banc 
Federal Circuit Court heard yet another argument, this time in the 
wake of the Supreme Court reversal of the court.1  The 
 
*  Former Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program and Professor of Law, 
George Washington University Law School; Partner, Foley & Lardner (Washington, 
D.C.).  The views expressed herein are strictly those of the author.  Email: 
halwegner@hotmail.com. 
This paper incorporates material and participant comments from: California Western 
School of Law, Festo Roundtable Conference (Aug. 13, 2002); Harold C. Wegner, 
Shedding the Equivalents Security Blanket: Festo and the Global Reality of Literal Protection 
(2002) (author’s paper from the Festo Roundtable Conference, California Western School of 
Law) (on file with author); Festo Symposium, Seminar Presentation to the Institute for 
Intellectual Property (June 28, 2002) (unpublished presentation, Tokyo, Japan); Harold C. 
Wegner, Address to the Japanese Group of the International Association for the Protection 
of Intellectual Property of Japan [AIPPI] (Tokyo, Japan) (June 27, 2002).  Contributions 
from Stephen B. Maebius to several of the above presentations are acknowledged with 
appreciation, as well work from our coauthored papers. See, e.g., Stephen B. Maebius & 
Harold C. Wegner, Federal Circuit Further Erodes Equivalents Doctrine, NAT’L L.J., 
Apr. 15, 2002, at C13. 
1 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002).  The Festo saga dates back to 1992, 
when the holder of two patents relating to magnetic rodless cylinders sued a competitor 
for infringement. See 535 U.S. at 728 (discussing the suit’s basis).  Following a finding 
by Special Master Herbert F. Schwartz, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts in 1994 found in Festo’s favor. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., No. 88-CV-1814, 1994 WL 1743984 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 1994), aff’d, 72 
F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated by 520 U.S. 1111 (1997).  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed. 72 F.3d at 857.  However, in light of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded. 520 U.S. at 
1111.  A Federal Circuit panel then issued an order asking for further briefing confined to 
the issues raised by Warner-Jenkinson, 117 F.3d 1385, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which was 
followed by a panel opinion on the merits. 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  This second 
panel opinion on the merits was then vacated by an en banc order for briefing several 
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disagreement among members of the Federal Circuit over the issue 
of equivalents2 may provide a new form of what Justice Stevens 
referred to as the “occasional conflict,” that “identif[ies] questions 
that merit th[e] Court’s attention”3 for further review. 
After a major Supreme Court pronouncement like Festo, the 
Courts of Appeal normally allow a wide variety of factual patterns 
and decisions to percolate up from the trial level.  The appeals 
courts also typically remand cases that were decided in the time 
between the trial court judgment and the Supreme Court opinion.  
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit initially took 
this approach in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Festo 
opinion.4  Yet, in what is only the latest in a series of unexpected 
events from Madison Place, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
ordered further consideration by the court, again en banc, of a set 
of questions, some general.5  The answers to these questions 
apparently will provide guidance to the patent community beyond 
the circumstances of the case and possibly will be “holdings” in 
the same sense as the en banc dicta most notoriously spawned in 
 
questions. 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  This led to the Federal Circuit’s notorious 
2000 opinion, 234 F.3d 558 (2000) (en banc), which in turn paved the way for the 2002 
Supreme Court opinion. See 522 U.S. at 726–28 (chronicling the case’s procedural 
history). 
2 In patent law, the doctrine of equivalents refers to a “judicial created theory for 
finding patent infringement when the accused process or product falls outside the literal 
scope of the patent claims. The doctrine evolved to prevent parties from evading liability 
for patent infringement by making trivial changes to avoid the literal language of the 
patent claims.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (7th ed. 1999). 
3 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“An occasional conflict in decisions may be useful in 
identifying questions that merit this Court’s attention.”). 
4 See, e.g., Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).  In Allen Engineering, the first precedential opinion squarely confronting the court 
with Festo-based questions, the Federal Circuit followed the practice that would be the 
norm for any other appeals court: it remanded the case for an initial determination by the 
trial court. Id. at 1342.  The Federal Circuit instructed the trial court to consider whether 
any of the amendments and arguments gave rise to prosecution history estoppel, limiting 
resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1350.  In its instruction, Allen Engineering 
cited Festo’s holding that “a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of 
the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.” Id. at 1350 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 736).  
See also id. at 1349–50 (providing additional guidance on this issue). 
5 Festo, 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (order). 
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the Kingsdown case.6  This is conceivable considering this 
particular Court of Appeals’ unique view that general guiding 
statements, extending beyond the facts needed to resolve a case, 
should be broadly used as more than mere dicta.7  This en banc 
dictum approach was squarely criticized by Judge Michel, a senior 
member of the Court of Appeals, and has clearly led the Federal 
Circuit down a unique path.8  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit of the 
1990s became a court of extreme judicial activism, culminating in 
the 2000 Festo opinion. 
This paper addresses unresolved conflicts surrounding the issue 
of equivalents.  Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s 2002 Festo 
opinion, surveying what is left for future consideration.  Part II 
examines perhaps the most significant patent law issue never 
formally considered by the Supreme Court—whether a judge or 
 
6 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(en banc in part). See infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of this case. 
7 See generally Colloquium, Panel Discussion on Intra-Circuit Conflicts, 11 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 623 (2001).  Judge Michel counseled caution in identifying the holding of a case: 
[I]t’s always a mistake to read a single case and try to discern from that case 
what a given rule of law is.  Almost always there are multiple cases dealing 
with the same rule of law.  You might compare them to a constellation of stars.  
You have to look at the whole pattern, the whole constellation to discern the 
outer bounds and the real content of the rule. 
Id. at 630.  Judge Gajarsa also suggested “a working partial definition of the word 
‘holding’”: Id. at 631. He advised the following: 
It has to include what the court actually decided.  Very often what’s cited as a 
conflict turns out to be a statement of a rule of law that’s given in the 
background portion of the opinion before the panel decision even discusses 
what the contentions were between which its deciding.  Seems to me that if it 
wasn’t something that was presented to us for a decision, a choice among 
alternatives, it can’t be part of the holding.  Even though it’s stated in black and 
white somewhere in the opinion.  So to me that’s not a holding and therefore 
can’t be the subject of a true conflict. 
Id. at 631–32. 
8 See id. at 645  
[W]e’re bound by case law and by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
use the en banc process to choose between the holdings of truly conflicting 
cases and declare which will be the law.  But it is not an appropriate use of the 
en banc process to just give guidance or to ‘clarify.’ It’s a conflict resolution 
mechanism, period.  So it’s asking too much of the en banc process to buff and 
refine every little part of the law.  The panels can do that and they should do 
that. 
Id. (statement of Judge Michel). 
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jury should determine the overall application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Part III questions the propriety of creating en banc 
dicta to cover a variety of situations, the decision-making mode 
unique to the Federal Circuit.  Part IV focuses on an extreme 
example of the Federal Circuit’s approach—the notorious en banc 
Kingsdown footnote.  Lastly, Part V discusses how the criticism 
the 2000 Festo opinion received, both in the Supreme Court and in 
interested industry circles, may serve as a partial antidote to the 
Federal Circuit’s trend of extreme judicial activism and lead the 
Court of Appeals back into its more traditional roles. 
I. ENTRAILS OF THE SUPREME COURT FESTO DECISION 
The Supreme Court’s 2002 Festo opinion clearly and sharply 
rebuked the majority’s earlier departure from precedent on the 
doctrine of equivalents.9  The practical impact on daily case 
management, however, was extremely minor because few cases 
could fit within the narrow exceptions of the disputable 
presumptions it created.10  This is, however, the way incremental 
changes are created through the certiorari process—by presenting 
narrowly defined questions coupled with minimal options available 
to the Court. 
Festo’s remnant principles are no substitute for the finely tuned 
equitable doctrine so meticulously crafted by Joseph Story and his 
successors in the more than 180 year period before this case.11  
What remains is a clear resolution for most cases that never should 
have applied the doctrine of equivalents under any tests, pre- or 
post-Festo.  Now the door is closed, as it would have been under 
the Story line of case law and should have been if trial cases were 
handled rigorously by judges with a keen patent law background.  
Yet, as in the days of Story and the subsequent 180-plus years, 
 
9 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 739 (“The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-
Jenkinson, which instructed that courts must be cautious before adopting changes that 
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.”) (citing Warner-Jenkinson 
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)). 
10 See id. 
11 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516–18 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (chronicling the development of the doctrine of equivalents), rev’d, 520 U.S. 
at 17. 
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there are egregious cases of copying inventions where equity 
demands a finding of infringement.  The doctrine of equivalents 
was crafted for these exceptional cases. 
The majority opinion in Festo undoubtedly fails to represent a 
fair solution to the long-term problem of patent infringement.  First 
and foremost, second-language foreign applicants are immediately 
subject to discrimination.  Anyone with knowledge of a second 
language knows there is rarely, if ever, a perfect correspondence 
between words in different languages that describe the same thing.  
Yet, if French, Chinese, German, or Japanese applicants take 
advantage of the Paris Convention, by first filing in their home 
country and native language,12 there surely will be some 
differences in the English translations that become the ultimate text 
of U.S. patent claims. 
It was already suggested that an estoppel might arise if a 
claim’s scope is narrowed due to a simple translation error that is 
later corrected.13  A typical high technological application may not 
even have established dictionary meanings and may contain over 
200 words susceptible to varying interpretations.  Surely one or 
more application will have an English term that provides a 
narrower meaning than the French, Chinese, German, or Japanese 
text.  Whether this provides a basis for prosecution history estoppel 
must be determined.  Further issues arise regarding whether such 
estoppel should only occur when the translated term is introduced 
 
12 The Paris Convention permits an applicant to file an application in foreign countries 
within a specified period from its home country’s filing date and still obtain the benefits 
of the domestic filing date for priority purposes and for prior art purposes. Convention of 
Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as revised July 14, 1967), 
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
13 The Supreme Court’s 2002 Festo opinion raised this possibility when it held that a 
narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to 
an estoppel. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 736.  According to the Court: 
Estoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment 
narrows the patent’s scope. If a [35 U.S.C.] § 112 amendment is truly cosmetic, then it 
would not narrow the patent’s scope or raise an estoppel. On the other hand, if a § 112 
amendment is necessary and narrows the patent’s scope—even if only for the purpose of 
better description—estoppel may apply. 
Id. at 736–37. 
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after filing in the U.S.,14 or whether it may also apply when the 
English term is simply narrower than the original French, Chinese, 
German, or Japanese text from the parent application.15  It is 
essential to clarify whether Festo therefore implicates that such 
foreign language applicants face a blanket bar to use of the 
doctrine of equivalents based solely on their sin of filing first in 
their native language. 
II. REOPENING THE EQUITY DOOR 
It was not for ordinary cases that the doctrine of equivalents 
was first crafted by Joseph Story over 180 years ago.  Rather, it 
exists for exceptional cases of unscrupulous takings of an 
invention through word games.  Brilliant patent jurists of Justice 
Story’s caliber would see the need for equivalents only in such 
situations.16 
 
14 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 736 (“The PTO might require the applicant . . . to improve the 
translation of a foreign word  . . .  In th[is] case[ ] the applicant has no intention of 
surrendering subject matter and should not be estopped from challenging equivalent 
devices.  While this may be true in some cases, petitioner’s argument conflates the 
patentee’s reason for making the amendment with the impact the amendment has on the 
subject matter.”). 
15 See Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The 
prosecution history of a parent application may be considered in construing claim terms.” 
(citing Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).  See also 
id. (“When multiple patents derive from the same initial application, the prosecution 
history regarding a claim limitation in any patent that has issued applies with equal force 
to subsequently issued patents that contain the same claim limitation.” (quoting Elkay, 
192 F.3d at 980)); Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 291 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that, for estoppel purposes, the relevant prosecution history 
included not only the application upon which the patent issued but also the parent and 
grandparent applications); Jonsson v. The Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818 (Fed. Cir. 
1990).  The holding in each of these cases dealt with use of a parent American 
prosecution history and not a foreign prosecution history in the case of a Paris 
Convention priority reliance. 
16 Like the modern day generalist judges from Wilmington and the Alexandria division 
of the Eastern District of Virginia, the best patent trial judges are those from courts of 
general jurisdiction who only hear a minority of cases involving patents, but a sufficient 
number to develop an experience base of true experts in the field.  Story’s major 
contributions to patent law were not achieved by sitting on occasion in Washington, D.C., 
with the odd patent appeal, but rather by his more usual position as a trial judge as circuit 
justice for the numerous patent cases heard in Boston. See Biographical Notice of Mr. 
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The Festo majority’s mechanistic test, however, leaves no 
room for a Story or modern judge to reach a finding of equivalents 
where it is essential for an equitable solution.17  The failure of the 
majority view is immediately implied from the en banc order of 
September 20, 200218 that reopened Festo to yet another en banc 
hearing on two additional questions.  Its first question reexamines 
whether the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine that a 
judge, without a jury, can and should decide.19 
The determination of equivalents, notwithstanding prosecution 
history estoppel, should be decided in a consistent manner with 
equivalents in general.  In dictum from en banc in Hilton Davis,20 a 
case from nearly a decade ago that spawned the current Festo 
controversy, the instant Court of Appeals had already issued a 
“holding” on “the issue of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents [as] an equitable remedy to be decided by the court, 
 
Justice Story, 3 AM. WHIG REV. 68 (1846), http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/ 
sgml/moa-idx?notisid=ABL5306-0003-10. 
17 The Federal Circuit’s en banc order states that the “Court differed with this court on 
the scope of equivalents available following a narrowing amendment.  Whereas we had 
held that any narrowing amendment made for reasons related to patentability effects a 
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents for the amended claim element, the Court held 
that a narrowing amendment instead raises a rebuttable presumption that the complete bar 
applies . . . .” Festo, 304 F.3d at 1290 (citation omitted) (explaining the Supreme Court’s 
position that under certain circumstances “the patentee can overcome the presumption 
that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence” if the patentee can show 
that “at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected 
to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent,” 
such as when the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of application, when the 
rationale underlying the amendment bears “no more than a tangential relation to the 
equivalent in question,” or when there is “some other reason suggesting that the patentee 
could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in 
question” (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 735 U.S. 
722, 740 (2002))). 
18 Festo, 304 F.3d at 1289. 
19 The first question posed by the Federal Circuit for review by its new en banc order 
was “[w]hether rebuttal of the presumption of surrender, including issues of 
foreseeability, tangentialness, or reasonable expectations of those skilled in the art, is a 
question of law or one of fact; and what role a jury should play in determining whether a 
patent owner can rebut the presumption.” Id. at 1290. See infra Part III for discussion of 
the second question raised. 
20 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
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or . . . issue of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury case.”21  
The approach advanced nearly a decade ago by the Court of 
Appeals’ leading academic scholar who specialized in equity, S. 
Jay Plager, was rejected.22  When leading bar organizations 
addressed the issue as amici curiae a decade ago in Hilton Davis, 
several could not reach a consensus and refrained from stating a 
position.23  One said that determining whether equivalents should 
be determined as a matter of law or equity 
can be reliably understood in the context of a policy choice 
involving substantive justice and notice.  In the end, which 
resolution is appropriate will flow from the relative values 
that the Court places on each.  In addition, whether the 
Court is willing to adopt a highly individualized rule 
regarding equivalents will depend, in large part, on how the 
Court sees the need to provide legal rules that are definite.24 
The American Bar Association noted that the Court has 
considered equivalents determination in the context of equity.25  
Nonetheless, it became “deeply divided” on what it said was “a 
close question.”26  Divided, the Bar’s blue ribbon team opined that 
“there are a number of policy reasons favoring district court 
judges, not juries, exercising their judicial discretion in 
 
21 Hilton Davis Chem., 62 F.3d at 1516. 
22 Id. at 1536–45 (Plager, J., dissenting).  Judge Plager makes the most compelling case 
for equity as the answer in the third section of his dissent. See id., 62 F.3d at 1539–45 
(Plager, J., dissenting). 
23 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association, Hilton Davis Chem., 62 
F.3d at 1512, reprinted in 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 345, 356 (1993); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
American Bar Association, Hilton Davis Chem., 62 F.3d at 1512, reprinted in 3 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 375, 375 (1993). 
24 Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association, supra note 23, at 356. 
25 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, supra note 23, at 383–84 (citing 
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30 (1929)). But cf. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 
531, 573 (1863) (explaining the contrary nineteenth century approach which employed a 
narrow definition of “equivalent,” rejecting the notion that “every combination of devices 
in a machine which is used to produce the same effect, is necessarily an equivalent for 
any other combination used for the same purpose,” and stressing that the machines must 
have “the same combination of mechanical devices, or substantially the same” to be 
considered equivalent). 
26 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, supra note 23, at 375. 
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determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  On 
the other hand the right to jury trial is important as well.”27 
To the extent the Court of Appeals seeks a final resolution of 
the issue of law versus equity, any decision on the matter would 
pave the way for such a determination by the Supreme Court.28  
The occasional conflict amongst panels and within an en banc 
court is healthy as it may help identify issues that merit the Court’s 
attention.29 
III. CLOUDING THE FUTURE WITH EN BANC DICTUM 
The second question raised by the Court of Appeals for en banc 
briefing was again found in the series of general questions 
designed to provide guidance for cases not in controversy: “What 
factors are encompassed by the criteria set forth by the Supreme 
Court?”30 
If a case like this were before any other Court of Appeals or 
before the Supreme Court, such a question that aims to provide 
broad guidance to solve future cases not in controversy would 
never be asked.  A question as complex as this one, that falls under 
the doctrine of equivalents, can only be properly determined on a 
case by case basis as an equitable matter and is therefore not 
susceptible to iron-clad formulaic rules.  Sufficient Supreme Court 
jurisprudence exists to apply to particular controversies and 
develop appropriate rulings on a case by case basis.31  The 
 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 595 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Plager, J., concurring) 
(“Today, the Court might well conclude that, since the so-called ‘objective’ approach has 
proven unworkable, a return to the equitable analysis approach would be the ‘better 
view.’ Particularly would this be so if [the Federal Circuit] court led the way . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
29 See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 
839 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“An occasional conflict in decisions may be useful 
in identifying questions that merit this Court’s attention.”). 
30 Festo, 304 F.3d at 1290. 
31 See generally Conrad J. DeWitte, Jr., Festo Change-O? No Way! Why the Supreme 
Court Should Reverse the Federal Circuit’s Attack on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 51 
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incremental determination of holdings necessary to resolve 
particular factual situations follows the time-honored manner for 
the evolution of case law.32 
It is a staple principle of hornbook law that advisory opinions 
are outside the scope of authority of the courts of appeal.33  
Accordingly, the leading Wright & Miller treatise simply states 
that “[t]he oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of 
justiciability is that federal courts will not give advisory 
opinions.”34  This has been honored by the Federal Circuit in areas 
outside patent law.35  Why then should patent law be treated 
differently? 
Making law through dictum is part of the larger puzzle of the 
“inconsistent application of the patent laws,”36 and recalls the 
criticisms of Tramposch.37  To craft new law that disregards 
 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1323 (2002) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence related to patent 
infringement claims). 
32 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
33 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529.1 (2d 
ed. 1984) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (stating that “the oldest and most 
consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give 
advisory opinions” (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1963))). 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(concerning a government contract dispute) (“An actual case or controversy is a 
prerequisite to justiciability of [the] appeal.  A court may and should raise the question of 
its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears in doubt.  At the heart of the ‘case or 
controversy’ requirement is the prohibition against advisory opinions.”) (citations 
omitted). 
36 Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough 
Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 791, 793–94 (1998) (“[T]he [c]ourt’s treatment of its own precedent has 
become unpredictable.  This unpredictability . . . will lead to exactly the opposite result 
that Congress sought in creating the [c]ourt.  Indeed, the inconsistent application of the 
patent laws resulting from inter-circuit conflicts will be replaced by inconsistent 
application of the patent laws resulting from intra-circuit conflicts, and the fate of 
litigants will begin to hinge more upon the make-up of the panel deciding the case than 
on the principles and rules announced in prior opinions.”). 
37 Albert G. Tramposch, The Dilemma of Conflicting Precedent: Three Options in the 
Federal Circuit, 17 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q. J. 323, 328–29 (1989) (criticizing the 
Federal Circuit’s practice of allowing the en banc court to address important, unsettled 
issues as undercutting the requirement that judicial law consist of holdings rather than 
dicta, and observing that the power to issue statements of law outside actual cases or 
controversies is reserved to the legislature). 
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precedent results in a “piecemeal” approach that “create[s] a patent 
law that is so complex that it requires litigation to determine the 
outcome for a given issue.”38  The Federal Circuit’s record of 
choosing en banc (or any other precedential) consideration of 
issues unnecessary to the resolution of the particular case manifests 
what two commentators, one a vice president of the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association, termed “judicial 
hyperactivity”39 and “hyperactive judging.”40 
The Federal Circuit has taken it upon itself—alone amongst all 
the Courts of Appeal—to provide what amounts to en banc 
advisory guidance, detached from the realities of an actual case or 
controversy.41  Merely because the court has taken such liberties in 
the past42 does not make the practice any more justifiable or any 
less contrary to that of the other courts of appeal. 
 
38 Ronald D. Hantman, Why Not the Statute? Revisited, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 685, 714 (2001). 
[T]he Federal Circuit, by not following precedent, is creating the law piecemeal 
without regard to how the pieces fit together.  Furthermore, their decisions 
often lack sufficient thought as to the long-term effects.  Probably, worst of all, 
they have created a patent law that is so complex that it requires litigation to 
determine the outcome for a given issue. 
Id. 
39 William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal 
Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000). 
(defining “judicial hyperactivity” as “a form of decision-making at odds with traditional 
notions of appellate review”). 
40 See id. at 729–30 
 The familiarity and expertise of the Federal Circuit judges with issues common 
to the court’s specialized jurisdiction may lead them more readily to usurp the 
fact-finding role. Almost since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been 
dogged with criticism for straying from the path carefully delineated for 
appellate tribunals. Disappointed litigants and commentators alike have 
criticized the court for fact-finding and other forms of hyperactive judging. 
Increasingly, the bar is expressing concern over the court’s decision-making 
procedures and its apparent willingness to take over the roles of patent 
examiner, advocate and trier of fact. 
Id. 
41 See MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(observing that construing patent claims without regard to what terms are actually 
disputed by the parties may run afoul of the “case or controversy” requirement). 
42 See infra Part III. 
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IV. THE NOTORIOUS EN BANC “KINGSDOWN FOOTNOTE” 
The two questions raised in the most recent Festo order will 
not be the last open-ended questions under the doctrine of 
equivalents.  It is possible, if the past is prologue, that some of 
these questions could well be answered sua sponte through the 
“Kingsdown footnote” practice that originated with the Kingsdown 
case.43  The opinion starts in an entirely uncontroversial manner as 
a precedential opinion from a three judge panel.44  At its 
conclusion, however, the case explodes into a series of brief 
statements of conflicting panel positions, each with a bright line 
resolution and a new statement of law.45  This final section in 
Kingsdown is preceded by a heading, Resolution of Conflicting 
Precedent, and a notorious footnote: “Because precedent may not 
be changed by a panel, this section has been considered and 
decided by an in banc court formed of MARKEY, Chief Judge, 
RICH, SMITH, NIES, NEWMAN, BISSELL, ARCHER, 
MAYER, and MICHEL, Circuit Judges.”46 
In resolving important conflicts, such as whether inequitable 
conduct is a question of law or equity, one could imagine a lengthy 
piece containing citation and analysis of conflicting scholarly 
views.  Yet the court’s resolution of this particular issue—in what 
is clearly an advisory opinion that never should be part of an 
appellate decision—consists of a mere three sentences.47  The first 
 
43 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(en banc in part). See also Tramposch, supra note 37, at 328–29, 332–34 (discussing the 
Kingsdown approach of settling a conflict of precedent in an en banc addendum to a 
panel decision). 
44 See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 869–76.  The panel portion of Kingsdown concerned an 
issue that it described as one of first impression: whether a patent is unenforceable where 
an attorney incorrectly represented a claim in a continuation application as having been 
allowed in the parent. See id. at 869–72.  The panel held that the circumstances of the 
case did not warrant a finding that the prosecuting attorney intended to deceive the Patent 
Office regarding the status of the claim in the parent application. See id. at 872–76. 
45 See id. at 876–77. 
46 Id. at 876 & n.16 (citing S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982) (en banc)). 
47 See id. at 876 (falling under the section entitled Nature of Question). 
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two sentences identify the conflict,48 and the remainder of the 
section is a single sentence of less than twenty-five words, devoid 
of any hint of why the decision was reached. 49 
The Kingsdown practice of tacking on an en banc addendum to 
an opinion to create a bright-line test in several areas of the law—
all without the benefit of even a single citation to a practitioner’s, 
scholar’s, or anyone’s comment50—has been followed by the court 
rather than condemned.51  If anything, the court has been proud of 
its high rate of en banc decision-making.52 
Glenn L. Archer, Jr., a member of the en banc Kingsdown court 
and later Chief Judge of the court, speaking in that capacity, cited 
Kingsdown as having “made an important contribution to decision-
making in the inequitable conduct area.”53  Entirely forgotten was 
the fact that the case was heard and decided before a three judge 
panel and that the important points were only “en banc” by virtue 
 
48 Id. (“Some of our opinions have indicated that whether inequitable conduct occurred 
is a question of law. In [another opinion], the court indicated that the inequitable conduct 
question is equitable in nature.”) (citations omitted). 
49 Id. (“We adopt the latter view, i.e., that the ultimate question of whether inequitable 
conduct occurred is equitable in nature.”). 
50 Like Kingsdown before it, there is not one single citation to a practitioner or scholar 
or any other source other than decisions of the various courts as basis for the en banc 
decision. See id. at 876–77; Tramposch, supra note 37. 
51 See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 n.5 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Because precedent may not be changed by a panel, the issue of ‘choice 
of circuit’ law . . . has been considered and decided unanimously by an in banc court 
consisting of MAYER, Chief Judge, RICH, NEWMAN, MICHEL, PLAGER, LOURIE, 
CLEVENGER, RADER, SCHALL, BRYSON, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 
1356, 1359 n.* (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in part) (“Because a panel of this court lacks the 
authority to overrule one of the court’s precedents, we are acting en banc with respect to 
the resolution of the choice of law issue. Accordingly, Chief Judge Mayer, Circuit Judge 
Rich, Senior Circuit Judge Smith, and Circuit Judges Newman, Michel, Plager, Lourie, 
Clevenger, Rader, Schall, Bryson, and Gajarsa join in . . . this opinion, which resolves the 
choice of law issue.”). 
52 Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Conflicts and the Federal Circuit, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
835, 837 (1996) (“[S]ince its creation, the Federal Circuit has decided fifty-eight cases in 
banc.  In the very recent past, we finished up with ten in banc cases, more than have been 
decided in any other similar period in the court’s history.  In spite of the extra burden on 
the court, in banc activity is extremely important to the development of the court’s body 
of law—it usually adds clarity and predictability to the law.”). 
53 Id. 
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of the Kingsdown footnote.54  Despite the obvious lack of clarity 
that is provided with a simple, one paragraph standard of law 
declaration (there is no careful recitation of any pros and cons or 
citation of competing authority as in Kingsdown55), the court has 
shown complete disregard for this obvious shortcoming in its self-
evaluation of Kingsdown.56 
Kingsdown was a classic example from the early years of the 
Court of Appeals during which it sought to break down complex 
issues into black and white rules and “the court tried to lay out 
some bright line tests.”57  Fourteen years after Kingsdown, the 
Court of Appeals has yet to come up with a uniform method of 
citing to a case where part of the opinion is en banc and part of it is 
not.  Sometimes, cases are referred to without reference to the case 
having been decided en banc, presumably referring to precedential 
portions of the opinion prior to the Kingsdown footnote.58  The 
more typical way to cite the en banc portion of the opinion is to 
simply refer to the opinion as being “en banc” (or, in earlier cases, 
 
54 Id. at 837 n.8 (citing Kingsdown only as “863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in banc)”).  
No reference is made to indicate that only a portion of the opinion is en banc.  See  id. 
55 Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 (citing conflicting case law on the issue of whether or 
not a finding of gross negligence compels a finding of intent to deceive and then simply 
adopting one view as the standard of law). 
56 Archer, supra note 52. (“[I]n banc activity is extremely important to the development 
of the court’s body of law—it usually adds clarity and predictability to the law.  
Obviously, this was true in cases such as Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister, 
Inc. . . . .”). 
57 Vito DiPietro, The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 370 (1992) (“Beginning with the 
Kingsdown case . . . there’s a section of that opinion entitled ‘Resolution of Conflicting 
Precedent’ which was decided by the court sitting en banc and in that section, the court 
tried to lay out some bright line tests.  For example, it discarded the idea that a finding of 
gross negligence itself satisfied the intent threshold.  It held that the ultimate issue of 
whether inequitable conduct occurred, is equitable in nature.  Inequitable conduct is 
committed to the discretion of the trial judge and is reviewed by the Federal Circuit under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Lastly, when a court has determined that inequitable 
conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims during prosecution, the entire patent is 
rendered unenforceable.”). 
58 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. 
Cir.1988).”) (parallel citation omitted); PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 
1235, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 
863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” (parallel citation omitted)). The pinpoint cites are to 
portions of the opinion prior to the Kingsdown footnote. 
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“in banc”).59  Judge Gajarsa introduced a better approach to 
citation of precedential case literature by referring to the opinion as 
being “en banc in relevant part.”60 
V. DEPARTURE FROM JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Festo followed a period of judicial activism where a Federal 
Circuit panel often deliberately reshaped the law to fit the policy 
reasons it perceived important enough to override even statutes or 
years of case law.61  This was sometimes achieved through pure 
dictum, totally unnecessary for the case.62  In the year 2000, when 
 
59 See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“[W]e review an ultimate conclusion of inequitable conduct under an abuse of discretion 
standard, Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. 
Cir.1988) (in banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067, 109 S. Ct. 2068 (1989).” ) (parallel 
citations omitted). 
60 Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (defining the Kingsdown decision as being “en banc in relevant part”) (“Inequitable 
conduct is an equitable issue committed to the discretion of the trial court and is, 
therefore, reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard. Kingsdown Med. 
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.1988) (en banc in 
relevant part).”) (parallel citation omitted).  There were several uses of this terminology 
in nonprecedential opinions, the first being in Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel 
Container, Inc., 69 F.3d 554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam).  Subsequent to Brasseler, this 
terminology was used in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 744 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). See also Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1344, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
61 See In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (demonstrating that earlier 
cases included the reshaping of what is “prior art” for obviousness under what is now 35 
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000), where the court in panel opinions judicially expanded two clear 
novelty-only provisions into the state of the art).  Most absurd was to change the 
forfeiture provision for late filing in the United States for an invention already patented 
by the same party in a foreign country into prior art via 35 U.S.C. § 102(d). See 
Kathawala, 9 F.3d at 946.  Four years later, the originality requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 
102(f) was transformed into prior art for obviousness. See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just 
Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
62 Most striking is the extension of 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) to the state of the art for 
obviousness under what is now 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).  The court in Kathawala had already 
found the claims in question unpatentable because the same invention was claimed in an 
earlier granted Greek counterpart patent, thereby rendering moot and unnecessary a 
decision on the issue of whether a Spanish counterpart claiming a different invention 
rendered the invention unpatentable. See Kathawala, 9 F.3d at 945.  Even though it was 
therefore unnecessary for the court to consider the additional foreign counterpart patents, 
the court went out of its way to do so and through dictum expanded the scope of prior art 
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Festo was decided by the Federal Circuit,63 a well intentioned 
majority must have thought that, once and for all, its latest act of 
judicial activism would create a bright-line test that would clear the 
cobwebs from the patent infringement scene, effectively abolishing 
the doctrine of equivalents.  The words of the late Giles Sutherland 
Rich go unheeded: “If the law as it has been written by Congress 
creates anomalous situations, then it is for Congress to decide 
whether to change the law.”64  Undoubtedly, there continues to be 
a narrow band of judicial activism that injects policy goals to 
change the law, including the controversial tinkering with the 
“written description” requirement65 and the Hatch-Waxman Act. 66  
Yet, the cold shower of the Supreme Court’s back-to-back 
opinions in Festo and Vornado may have started to shift the 
equation on Madison Place to a more balanced role of this Court of 
Appeals as an interpreter and not creator of the law. 
 
for obviousness. See id. at 946.  The extension of the law was based upon policy grounds. 
See id. at 947 (“It would be contrary to the policy of the statute to permit an applicant to 
file a foreign application on an invention that may be claimed by four related types of 
claims, obtain a grant of whatever patent rights were available in the foreign country, and 
then file an application in the United States, after the foreign patent has issued and more 
than one year after the foreign filing date on the same invention, with claims directed to 
those aspects of the invention which were unpatentable in the foreign country.”) 
(emphasis added). 
63 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
64 Studiengesellschaft Köhle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 357 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (quoting Judge Giles from In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 1113–14 
n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).  
 65 See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(reading into § 112 a requirement that a “written description” not be present for a generic 
claim that eliminates an original claim limitation); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (injecting a possession requirement into the 
“written description” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112). See also Harold C. Wegner, When 
a Written Description Is Not a “Written Description”: When Enzo Says It’s Not, 12 FED. 
CIR. BAR J. 271 (2002). 
 66 See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 02-CV-1449, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6003, at *72 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2003) (per curiam) (Linn, J., concurring) (criticizing 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003), by stating that 
“[h]owever compelling [the Warner-Lambert policy] arguments may be, it is the function 
of Congress, not the courts, to shape legislation in accordance with policy goals”).  Judge 
Schall, joined by Judge Clevenger, also issued a concurrence in Allergan critical of 
Warner-Lambert. See id at *36–*68 (Schall, J., concurring). 
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CONCLUSION 
No matter what the Federal Circuit may do in the latest round 
of the Festo case, the damage created to the fabric of infringement 
law cannot be readily undone.  At some point there must be a 
return to treating the doctrine of equivalents as a measure that is 
used only if demanded by the interests of equity and if carefully 
administered by a judge, not a jury.  Necessary reforms may 
include legislation to achieve this goal67 or reforming the reissue 
statute.68 
 
 67 In the Pacific Patent Facilitation Act of 2003, discussion draft, version 3.1 (Mar. 
28, 2003), a proposed 35 U.S.C. § 271(k) provision would provide that “[a] claim shall be 
infringed only if an accused embodiment is within the literal limits thereof, with the 
proviso that a court where the interests of equity demand may find an equivalent 
embodiment to be an infringement” (on file with author). 
 68 Another section proposes consolidating reissue and reexamination into a single 
proceeding where broadened claims would be permitted at any time but subject to strict 
intervening rights. See id. 
